As the wreck of Bayesian broke the surface off Porticello, Sicily, at the weekend, I’m sure many of us across the industry winced simply because it laid bare how much we still don’t know. The salvage had been scheduled for months, but seeing her broken structure re-emerge brought a clarity tainted with an overriding discomfort, marking the beginning of a much larger reckoning yet to come.

Just under a year ago, the 60-metre Perini Navi set sail for the last time. She was professionally crewed, professionally managed, flagged in the UK, classed by ABS and had stability documentation signed off under LY2. Everything seemed fine on paper.

But in the early hours of 19 August 2024, she capsized in seconds whilst anchored off the Sicilian coast with 22 people on board. Six guests and one crew member died that morning. The death toll would rise again on 9 May 2025, when a diver lost his life in the salvage operation.

It’s a tragedy that has profoundly affected the sector, capturing global attention, scrutiny and sorrow. Meanwhile, we’ve been left to cut through the noise amidst waves of distasteful speculation, half-truths, blame-shifting and wild accusations.

The MAIB’s interim report, released in mid-May, provides a detailed analysis of the incident, pointing to potential operational and systemic failures, albeit with the luxury of hindsight.

In its wake, it has triggered serious questions across the industry. Many who initially may have believed this was an unavoidable freak accident are now asking whether it was, in fact, entirely preventable, perhaps even before the boat set sail.

What is pertinent to us is settling what actually happened that day. Families left for a celebration and returned in mourning. Colleagues started a regular shift and didn’t make it home. These are facts, not a conspiracy. But why did it happen? And perhaps more importantly, how do we ensure it never happens again?

Image Credit: MAIB Interim Report - Bayesian - Very Serious Marine Casualty

As it happened

On the evening of 18 August, Bayesian was anchored off Cefalù. As forecasts predicted thunderstorms advancing from the west, the captain decided to relocate, some 25 nautical miles to the west, to Porticello, with better shelter and simpler disembarkation the following day.

By 21:24, she was anchored east of Porticello’s breakwater. The centreboard was fully raised, sea conditions were calm, winds light, with occasional lightning visible in the distance.

Aware of the forecast, the skipper instructed overnight watchkeepers to wake him if winds exceeded 20 knots or if there was any sign of dragging. By 03:00, winds were steady at 8 knots from the west. By 0330, lightning was growing closer. At 0355, one of the watchkeepers filmed the approaching storm, briefly posting it to social media, before securing the forward hatches.

By 04:00, winds had jumped from 8 to 30 knots, and anchor dragging was detected. The skipper was immediately woken and moved to the flying bridge. The chief engineer had already activated generators, steering pumps, hydraulic systems and controllable pitch propeller hydraulics, preparing the vessel to manoeuvre into the wind if required.

By this stage, Bayesian had developed a noticeable starboard list, estimated at 10 to 20 degrees, drifting at around 1.8 knots to the south-southeast. The owner had made their way up to the wheelhouse and was present on deck as the situation developed.

But minutes later, a mesocyclonic storm cell delivered a violent downdraft with gusts exceeding 70 knots. Bayesian heeled rapidly beyond her calculated vanishing stability angle of 70.6 degrees and capsized in less than 15 seconds.

Crew responded rapidly, activating EPIRBs, firing flares, and gathering survivors. A liferaft was deployed and used as a refuge, and nearby vessels responded, recovering the 15 survivors within the hour.

Image Credit: MAIB Interim Report - Bayesian - Very Serious Marine Casualty

What remains under investigation are the conditions that left the yacht so exposed to such rapid failure

Firstly, the weather. Forecasts in the days leading up to the incident predicted unstable weather, with thunderstorms, heavy rain and poor visibility expected. A gale warning had also been issued for Sardinia and Corsica, but nothing was in force for the north coast of Sicily. With winds steady at 8 knots and only intermittent lightning visible, conditions remained relatively calm when the boat first anchored.

At 03:52, however, winds were recorded to have jumped suddenly from 5 to 41 knots around five nautical miles northwest of Porticello as a storm front advanced towards the coast. The squall, which threw debris and horizontal rain through the small port town, reached Bayesian’s position minutes later.

Post-incident analysis from the UK Met Office confirms that the supercell had developed as part of a larger low-pressure trough moving through the region. It concludes that surface-level downdrafts likely delivered winds well over 87 knots at the time of the capsize.

And while the storm explains the force applied, the more challenging question is why the vessel’s stability margins proved so fragile when tested, right when it really mattered. The exact centreboard position, the vessel’s loading condition, the sequence of downflooding, watertight integrity and the status of lifesaving appliances remain under investigation now that the physical wreck is available for forensic inspection.

According to post-incident analysis, conducted by the Wolfson Unit as part of the MAIB investigation, the modelling already exposes areas of vulnerability.

The vessel’s approved Stability Information Book, certified under LY2, included stability curves (formal calculations showing her righting ability at various angles of heel) for her sailing configuration: sails deployed, centreboard lowered.

But it did not require, nor did it contain, equivalent curves for the configuration she was actually in whilst anchored that night: motoring and the centreboard fully raised.

In that condition, the yacht’s high mast and rigging presented significant windage, while righting ability was substantially reduced, with analysis showing that beam-on gusts above 63.4 knots could capsize her. She encountered considerably more than that on the night.

And like most yachts, large hybrid sailing yachts routinely spend long periods stationary or manoeuvring with centreboards raised, exposing them to stability vulnerabilities that may never appear on paper.

These aren’t new technical principles either. The effects of wind-induced heel-reduced underwater lift from a retracted centreboard and high topside windage are well understood both on and off-shore. But operationally, are these factors being treated as matters for crew management rather than formal design approval?

Image Credit: MAIB Interim Report - Bayesian - Very Serious Marine Casualty

Bayesian’s loss demonstrates how narrow that margin becomes when conditions shift in an instant. The notion that such a question is only addressed once a vessel is afloat (or not addressed at all) is farcical and dangerous. These are fundamental design issues that should be handled in a naval architect’s office long before a yacht ever leaves the yard.

These conditions bring a degree of operational scrutiny in tandem, however. The crew followed standing orders: the skipper would be woken if winds exceeded 20 knots or if dragging was detected. But that happened at 04:00, moments before the capsize. The rapid escalation of the storm left no time for intervention.

In hindsight, one might ask whether earlier, more conservative action was possible. Lightning had been visible for some time. Could lowering the centreboard earlier have made a difference? Should deteriorating weather and visual cues trigger earlier escalation regardless of measured wind speed?

These are not questions of fault, but of operational disciplines in the face of increasingly volatile weather patterns. If environmental commentators and the scarily abundant wealth of data at their disposal are to be believed, the Med will likely experience increased rates of freakishly violent weather systems over the next decade and beyond.

The assumption that rare weather events will remain rare is misguided and we can’t rely on professionalism alone to compensate for design compromises. The Met Office analysis confirms that mesoscale convective systems, violent downdrafts, and supercell formations are becoming more common as sea temperatures rise.

There is also increasing public pressure, namely from the victims’ families. The family of the ship’s chef, Recaldo Thomas, who lost his life during the capsize, has rightly raised pointed concerns about the chain of failures that allowed such issues to persist.

Representing the family in a public statement, James Healy-Pratt, partner at law firm Keystone Law, writes that the disaster highlights critical failures in design, safety certification, seaworthiness and the management decisions taken by some of the crew in the face of a forecast storm.

“The Thomas family firmly believe that Rick (Recaldo) died doing his job and that his death was preventable,” reads the statement.

“The family note that the Bayesian was an outlier in design, with a single mast structure, longer than the wingspan of a jumbo jet, that acted like an aerofoil in the storm conditions. They also note that the owner, Angela Bacares, was up on deck when a number of questionable decisions were being carried out by some of the crew.

“They know that further evidence and analysis is required in areas including downflooding and seamanship, and they await the final MAIB safety report and its inevitable list of safety recommendations. The Thomas family are firmly resolute in their journey for truth, very public justice, and preventing future tragedies.”

Within this lies the elephant in the room that the report has yet to directly confront: was the rig simply too large for the vessel’s true stability margins when stationary? And if it was, who bears responsibility for its design decision?

Image Credit: MAIB Interim Report - Bayesian - Very Serious Marine Casualty

What happens now?

This tragedy must force a broader reckoning. Historically, moments like this often become formative in driving the next generation of regulation; as the Titanic led to SOLAS, so too could Bayesian catalyse a much-needed re-examination of design and stability standards, certification frameworks and operational accountability across the large sailing yacht sector.

Stability assessments must evolve for designers to reflect operational reality, not just ideal sailing conditions. And exemptions built around legacy sailing yacht categories are increasingly difficult to defend when hybrid modes dominate real-world use for regulators.

For managers and captains, there may be a call for stricter risk management protocols, particularly when operating with narrow margins in potentially volatile conditions. Within that, there may even be a broader argument for insurers on how comprehensively stability vulnerabilities are disclosed and assessed as an extra incentive to do so.

And for owners and designers, it might serve as sobering warning of when a design ambition is driven by aesthetics, recreational racing aspirations, or marketing cachet. If a design compromise allows a 72-metre mast to dominate the stability profile of a vessel that spends most of its life motoring or anchored, we must ask ‘At what price was that ambition pursued?’ And not in monetary terms.

While the final MAIB report will deliver its conclusions, the incident has already exposed how regulatory assumptions, design frameworks and operational practices can leave risks insufficiently examined. But now, enough information is available to recognise how thin certain assumptions have worn. 

It took seconds for Bayesian to sink. It has taken years for these gaps to emerge. And they are unlikely to go unaddressed for much longer.

Click here to become part of The Superyacht Group community, and join us in our mission to make this industry accessible to all, and prosperous for the long-term. We are offering access to the superyacht industry’s most comprehensive and longstanding archive of business-critical information, as well as a comprehensive, real-time superyacht fleet database, for just £10 per month, because we are One Industry with One Mission. Sign up here.